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Abstract This research note uses in-depth interviews, ethnographic observations, and
archival records to examine the self-understandings of think tank-affiliated policy experts. I
argue that policy experts draw on a series of idioms—those of the academic scholar, the
political aide, the entrepreneur, and the media specialist—to construct a unique albeit
synthetic professional identity. The essence of the policy expert’s role lies in a continuous
effort to balance and reconcile the contradictory imperatives associated with these idioms.
An analysis of the policy expert’s mixed “professional psyche” offers a useful point of entry
into the objective social structure of the think tank.
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Over the last four decades, the intellectual pronouncements of a growing breed of
organizations known as think tanks have become fixtures of public debate in America. As
the number of think tanks in the US has roughly quadrupled (Rich 2004), the public policy
specialists employed at these organizations (hereafter “policy experts”) have taken on a
more visible political role. Policy experts commonly testify before Congress (Rich and
Weaver 1998; McCright and Dunlap 2003), speak as news media pundits (Rich and Weaver
2000; Abelson 2002), and draft transition manuals for incoming presidential administra-
tions (see, e.g., Feulner 1980). Yet despite the proliferation and growing visibility of think
tanks and policy experts in the US, social scientists have paid relatively little attention to
them, leaving certain fundamental questions unanswered.
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This paper addresses a series of related questions: how do think tank-affiliated experts
understand and talk about their own role?1 What styles, skills, and sensibilities do they
regard as central to their mission? What are the major lines of separation among them? My
argument is that, lacking a conventional definition of what it means to be a policy expert,
such actors improvise one using a mixture of ready-made cultural materials supplied by the
more established institutions on which they depend for their resources and credibility.
Policy experts draw especially on four idioms to characterize their own role—those of the
academic scholar, who generates authoritative knowledge according to collectively defined
standards of rigor and cognitive autonomy; the policy aide, who must familiarize himself
with the unique rules of order, procedural details, and temporal rhythms of electoral
politics; the business entrepreneur, who must be an effective salesperson in a competitive
marketplace, and the media specialist, who must disseminate knowledge in a format that is
both accessible and compelling to the wider public. While each idiom reveals an important
dimension of the policy expert’s role, it is in the never-ending attempt to balance and
reconcile these contradictory functions that I find the essence of the policy expert’s
professional identity.
My discussion is divided into two sections. In the first part, I will describe how the four
idioms listed above guide and condition the self-understandings of policy experts. Each
trope, I argue, functions both as an anchoring metaphor and as a bundle of literal claims
about the proper style and manner of a policy expert. The second section considers the
policy expert’s dispositional hybridity as a window into the objective social structure of the
think tank. Here I will argue that the mixed professional stance common among policy
experts arises out of the think tank’s intermediate location in the social structure relative to
the worlds of academia, politics, business, and the media.
The policy expert as academic scholar
The symbolic point of departure from which policy experts construct their mixed self-
descriptions is an idiom of academic production. Policy experts commonly invoke the
figure of the university scholar in discussing their own role. In this language, the policy
expert should aim to develop cumulative knowledge based on rigorous empirical data for
publication in books and articles. He should possess a sharp mind, keen analytical abilities,
advanced academic training, and freedom from both partisan bias and political and
economic constraint.2 As the president of the Brookings Institution told the Washington
1 My analysis is based on 43 formal interviews with representatives from think tanks and proximate
institutions, archival records gathered from more than a dozen manuscript collections, and ethnographic
fieldwork conducted at various think tank-sponsored events. The interview subjects included think tank
founders and upper managers, rank-and-file researchers and staff members, and people who deal routinely
with the work of think tanks, such as congressional staff members, newspaper and magazine reporters, and
administrators of philanthropic foundations. The archival records include organizational histories, personal
letters and memoirs, mission statements, biographical and autobiographical accounts, and materials related to
the founding and decision-making processes of think tanks.
2 I use the pronoun “him” not for stylistic purposes but to reflect the predominantly male make-up of the
think tank world. For example, in 2001, Washington Post columnists Morin and Deane (2001) reported on
the gender imbalance among policy experts at seven major think tanks (Urban, CSIS, Brookings, Heritage,
Cato, AEI, and IPS). In combination, their count showed 279 men (67.9%) and 132 women (32.1%) working
as expert staff members at these organizations. The only think tank in the group that had more female than
male policy experts was the Institute for Policy Studies (11 to 6). The most unbalanced think tank was the
Cato Institute (35 men, 1 woman).
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Post in 2004, “We make a real effort to keep our policy [analyses] objective in the sense
that we let chips fall where they may as we identify the big questions and seek the big
answers—rather than letting our product be skewed in any fashion by ideological or
partisan preferences.”3
The academic idiom commonly extends from the actor to the organization: if the policy
expert is like a scholar, then the think tank is said to be like a “university without
students.”4 Indeed, many think tanks refer to their expert staff members as “scholars” and
“fellows,” irrespective of their actual affiliations or credentials. Many also have endowed
staff positions reminiscent of university professorships. (For example, the Heritage
Foundation has the Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies, Brookings the Bruce and
Virginia MacLaury Chair in Economic Studies, and AEI the Joseph J. and Violet Jacobs
Scholar in Social Welfare Studies.) Other think tanks explicitly compare themselves to
universities or describe their intellectual production as “scholarship.” In 1997, for example,
the Cato Institute launched a division called the “Cato University” that offered educational
seminars for aspiring libertarians.5 Finally, a few think tanks, including the Brookings
Institution, have world wide web addresses with the suffix “.edu”—and at least one, the
RAND Corporation, has a degree-granting capacity.6
Policy experts invoke the language of academic production in personal interviews as
well, as the following interview excerpts illustrate:
I: What are the major considerations discussed in a board meeting?
R: Our board wants to know if we’re publishing good quality scholarship and if it
contributes to making America a better place.7
***
I: What are the forms of expertise that you have to have?
R: ...You can’t sell superficial ideas on any sustained basis, so you also have to be
generating serious analysis...so that your work is credible and is recognized by
academic leaders and policy leaders as something that they should pay attention to.8
***
I: What are the marks of a good research product in the context of the policymaking
process?
R: Well, good research is good research, whether it’s policy-oriented or not. It’s
transparent. It’s replicable.9
***
3 Washington Post online chat, http://www.washingtonpost.com/, retrieved on September 14, 2004.
4 See, for example, Weaver (1989) and Tolchin (1983), in which Brookings policy expert Herbert Kaufman
remarks, “This is a university without students.”
5 See http://www.cato-university.org/, retrieved on June 15, 2006.
6 The Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School awards degrees in policy analysis, which the organization
describes as “a multidisciplinary, applied field that tries to use research to unlock difficult policy problems.”
See http://www.prgs.edu/curriculum, retrieved on July 31, 2006.
7 Author interview, David Boaz, Cato Institute, November 24, 2003.
8 Author interview, Clyde Prestowitz, Economic Strategy Institute, July 28, 2003.
9 Author interview, James Weidman, Heritage Foundation, June 26, 2003.
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GA: Brookings has a very—it’s like a university. The range of views there, the range of
opinions. The one thing that is consistent is that the people they have there are of the
highest caliber. They have all the badges they need to accumulate to be viewed as an
expert.10
The fact that policy experts adopt an idiom of academic production is not surprising
given that the earliest think tanks were founded with the express purpose of spanning the
divide between universities and politics (Critchlow 1985; Smith 1991a, b). The original
mission statement of the Brookings Institution, for example, reads in part, “In its
conferences, publications, and other activities, Brookings serves as a bridge between
scholarship and policymaking, bringing new knowledge to the attention of decisionmakers
and affording scholars greater insight into public policy issues.”11 Far less obvious,
however, is the fact that policy experts actively downplay their resemblance to scholars
when speaking about other aspects of their role.
The policy expert as political aide
A second language of professional duty imagines the policy expert not as a scholar, but as a
political aide whose main obligation is to be familiar with the distinctive rules of order,
procedural details, temporal rhythms, and norms of reciprocity guiding American politics.
In this trope, the essential characteristics of a policy expert include the ability to anticipate
“hot” policy issues before they arise and the capacity to churn out useful reports quickly to
coincide with these developments. Like a congressional aide, the policy expert should
possess detailed knowledge of the workings of legislative and executive agencies and a
familiarity with the language of policy debate. Prior political experience is a valuable asset,
and the measure of a good policy report is less its scholarly rigor than its functionality in the
policymaking process. Being “too scholarly,” in fact, is a fatal flaw.12 As the executive
director of the Northeast-Midwest Institute explains, “You have to...know how to move [an
idea] through the policy labyrinth that is this legislative body and administrative body”:
I: And what are the considerations that are taken into account?
R: Well, it’s various things. Who sits on what [congressional] committee? Who has
seniority? Who sets the policy agenda for that committee? What other stakeholders
can be aligned with the proposal that you have that would make it more acceptable to
the powers that be on the relevant committees that have to deal with this?
I: Coalition-building?
R: Yeah, coalition building. Vote-counting, in a way. At the end of the day, on a particular
subcommittee, are you going to get out of there with a favorable vote or not? You’ll
not always, but often, have to think, “Will it sell on the Hill?”13
10 Author interview, Greg Anrig, Century Foundation, November 22, 2003.
11 See, for example, Brookings Institution (2007).
12 Reflecting on the American Enterprise Institution’s declining status in the think tank world in the 1980s,
Heritage Foundation fellow Lee Edwards reports, “They [had] become more interested in debating the issues,
not [in] having a point of view. They had also gotten into the habit of doing big long studies, fat studies and
volumes, and so forth—being a little too, in their writing, perhaps a little too scientific.” Author interview,
Lee Edwards, Heritage Foundation, July 8, 2003.
13 Author interview, Richard Munson, Northeast-Midwest Institute, July 10, 2003.
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According to one policy expert, “Having former government service helps a lot. I think
there’s a certain aura that comes with, ‘He is the former ambassador to the Soviet Union,’
or, ‘He is the former Undersecretary of State.’ You know, the fact that it was 20 years ago
and you’re kind of pontificating on a subject that you did absolutely nothing on at that point
in your life, that doesn’t matter. It’s just, ‘The former this.’ You know, people need a title,
and that helps.”14
According to this metaphor, a policy expert succeeds by positioning himself as an
effective player in the policymaking process—for example, by supplying legislative
testimony, briefing members of Congress, or writing “talking points” memoranda for
candidates and politicians. Cultivating access to political networks and staying on top
of day-to-day policy developments are “musts” for the policy expert. According to
one Brookings fellow, a good policy expert “tries to keep current, I mean, to be
working on things that are relevant [to policy debates].”15 The president of the
Economic Strategy Institute likewise explains, “You have to be in tune to [policy]
developments and take advantage of opportunities to use those developments and respond
to them by writing articles, getting that in the press, getting testimony up on the Hill....
You have to understand the issues and the players in the policy areas that you’re dealing
with.”16 Failing to generate studies with obvious relevance to political debate can
marginalize a policy expert and compromise his or her ability to attract media attention
and financial support.
The policy expert as entrepreneur
A third language of professional duty imagines the policy expert, not as a scholar or a
policy aide, but as an entrepreneur in a “marketplace of ideas.” In this trope, the central
goal is to market one’s intellectual wares to three kinds of consumers: legislators, who
“buy” ideas by incorporating them into policy; financial donors, whose purchase is
somewhat more literal because it involves giving money to the think tank; and journalists,
who figuratively buy think tank studies by citing them and quoting their authors. In this
metaphor, a good policy expert must possess the attributes of a successful marketer: “people
skills,” a taste for self-promotion, and a knack for re-packaging ideas to broaden their
appeal. The commercial metaphor commonly extends from the actor to the organization:
like corporations vying for market share, think tanks are said to compete with one another
in a crowded “marketplace of ideas.”
Policy experts routinely invoke the concepts of salesmanship and commercial
transaction to characterize their setting and the attributes needed to excel in it. Asked to
name the marks of a good policy expert, for example, the founder and president of the
Economic Strategy Institute explains:
You gotta be a salesman. You have to present your ideas crisply, convincingly,
interestingly, and you have to have enormous energy. You have to have what the
salesmen call “closing ability.” Not only do you make the presentation, but you have
to ask for the order. And the order may be a donation or the order may be a bill or a
14 Author interview, Bruce Stokes, National Journal and Council on Foreign Relations, June 30, 2003.
15 Author interview, Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution, February 11, 2004.
16 Author interview, Clyde Prestowitz, Economic Strategy Institute, July 28, 2003.
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policy idea that you’re trying to sell. But you have to be able to ask for the order and
get it.17
Edwin Feulner, the president of the Heritage Foundation, reflects on the secrets of a
successful think tank in the following terms: “The key ingredient is the person who heads
it...must be entrepreneurial enough to see the unique need [and] salesman enough to
convince others (donors, professors to write the papers, and policy makers and journalists)
to listen to him and his people.”18 Feulner used the same trope in a 1985 speech: “It takes
an institution to help propagandize an idea—to market an idea.... Proctor and Gamble does
not sell Crest toothpaste by taking out one newspaper ad or running one television
commercial. They sell and re-sell it every day, by keeping the product fresh in the
consumer’s mind. [Think tanks] sell ideas in much the same manner” (Feulner 1985).
A veteran of several think tanks extends this trope by distinguishing between a good
policy expert and someone who is merely a good thinker:
There are people who are wonderful thinkers, wonderful writers, but they feel very
uncomfortable promoting themselves. And what you need [in a think tank] is self-
promoters. I think that some of the best people in this game have been shameless self-
promoters....They’ve got to want to sell their idea. They’ve got to be willing to make
the phone calls to the press, push to get on the TV show, stay up nights writing the
extra op-ed piece. People who are neurotic that way often are the best people. People
who say, “Well, I’ve said all I have to say on that idea. It’s here. Now I want to go
and do something else,” they don’t tend to be as successful.19
In the words of one think tank director, a policy expert should be “innovative” and always
able “to come up with sort of a new twist or a new angle on an idea.”20
The salesmanship idiom is not new, having crystallized in the widely used expression
“policy entrepreneur” by the early 1980s.21 While the imagery might seem more in keeping
with a conservative vision of policy expertise than a progressive one, its use is not limited
to those on the right. Progressive journalist and Center for American Progress fellow Eric
Alterman, for example, uses this trope in an interview:
I: Can you tell me something about the set of skills that you need in order to be a
successful think tanker, for lack of a better term?
R: Well, there is sort of a public policy entrepreneur personality...which basically
involves being a good schmoozer. That’s really all there is to it.
I: Schmoozer with journalists? With political figures?
17 Author interview, Clyde Prestowitz, Economic Strategy Institute, July 28, 2003.
21 The earliest use of this term in a major newspaper appears to have been in Hall (1983). A notable use of
the expression is in Rothenberg’s (1987) profile of policy expert Pat Choate, “The Idea Merchant”:
Choate is known in Washington as a “policy entrepreneur,” part of a small community of academics
and writers whose articles and speeches and fat Rolodex files help to set the national political agenda.
Says William A. Galston of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, a liberal think tank: “A
policy entrepreneur is analogous to the entrepreneur in the private sector. He is the person who creates
the venture, who invents the concept of the product and then goes out and markets it.” The difference,
Galston adds, is that “Pat Choate’s working with political capital, not cash.”
20 Author interview, Richard Munson, Northeast-Midwest Institute, July 10, 2003.
19 Author interview, Bruce Stokes, National Journal and Council on Foreign Relations, June 30, 2003.
18 Washington Post online chat, http://www.washingtonpost.com/, retrieved on September 11, 2004. Feulner
went on to explain the meteoric rise of his organization in these terms: “If an entrepreneur markets what
people want, he will be successful. That’s what it’s all about.”
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R: With whomever. I mean, a lot of academics are very inarticulate, more so in the hard
sciences than in the short [sic] sciences. You know, they write essays and they’re shy
and stuff. [In] think tanks, you’re better off being somewhat gregarious and not being
that shy about selling yourself.
The policy expert as media specialist
Newer and less salient than the first three idioms is a fourth trope emphasizing the
resemblance between policy experts and communications specialists. In this language, a
policy expert must exhibit a knack for writing in plain language and a willingness to
compose short, compact studies in a form similar to press releases or newspaper articles.
Policy experts must “have a sense of what’s going to be newsworthy,” in the words of one
respondent.22 They should be “able to consolidate their technical, complex ideas into
something that is really very understandable—that is, a sound bite, if you will.” The
president of ESI summarizes the point in this way: “Public relations, media relations—or
media savvy—is a very important aspect of the business.”23 Says another policy expert:
“It’s true in journalism and it’s true in think tanks: to be a successful think tank person, you
need to be able to write in a way that is understandable to non-specialists....It’s a matter of
making complicated matters understandable in colloquial terms.”24
When asked to describe a good policy argument, one policy expert says,
First of all, it has to be intelligible. It has to be brief, and digestible. We don’t tend to
generate large major reports....By and large what we produce is less than ten pages
and our talking points are one page. And our columns are 750 words. They’re op-ed
length because we want people to actually be able to read them and digest them and
apply them. So I think the most important characteristic of the work we’re trying to
put out is that it be accessible and respectful of people’s information overload, and
their limited time.25
For some policy experts, comfort and eloquence on television are prized assets that go hand
in hand with good writing ability. As a Competitive Enterprise Institute fellow explains,
“With doing broadcast interviews—well, specifically TV—your body language is so
important. As important, if not more important, than actually the words that you use. [CEI
president] Fred [Smith, Jr.] is very good at it. He’s got the energy and the quips, and the
producers love him, so he’s on TV a lot. And of course he does radio well, too. But his
energy—he really does TV. That’s his forte.”26
The use of a communications model reflects one of the major tendencies among think
tanks since the 1970s. Once media-shy, many think tanks now employ communication
specialists, maintain media outreach departments, and reward their fellows for publishing
op-ed pieces in the newspaper and appearing on television (Weaver 1989).27 As the
22 Author interview, Richard Munson, Northeast-Midwest Institute, July 10, 2003.
27 A striking symbol of this shift came in the 1990s, when the Brookings Institution, an organization once
averse to news media attention, built an $800,000 television studio on its own premises. Author interviews,
Stephen Hess, Brookings Institution, July 16, 2003; Ed Berkey, Brookings Institution, March 28, 2006.
26 Author interview, Jody Clarke, Competitive Enterprise Institute, December 16, 2003.
25 Author interview, Mark Agrast, Center for American Progress, July 27, 2004.
24 Author interview, Eric Alterman, Center for American Progress, November 21, 2003.
23 Author interview, Clyde Prestowitz, Economic Strategy Institute, July 28, 2003.
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importance of publicity has grown, policy experts have developed fine-grained categories
for assessing the news media universe. Asked to name the most desirable outlets in which
to be quoted, cited, or to publish their work, few find themselves at a loss for words, as
these interview excerpts suggest:
[In the] print media, the place to be is the New York Times. The Wall Street Journal, if
you’re an economist. The Washington Post for local Washington exposure, including
Congress and the government, but the Washington Post doesn’t have the national
reach that the Times and the Journal do.28
***
The Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times. On trade or budget [issues], those are
the papers that you want to reach for. The New Republic or the Weekly Standard are
more niche-oriented weeklies, one being more liberal, one being more conservative,
but we have friends in both.29
***
If you want to get your article talked about, it had better be in the Post, the Times, or
the Journal. In magazines, The New Republic, the Atlantic Monthly. I think to a lesser
extent The Weekly Standard and National Review. ...Harpers, I think, has become
kind of ridiculous. And the Atlantic Monthly...has just soared beyond Harpers.30
***
R: Andy Kohut, who’s my boss at Pew, places incredibly great store in the [PBS Jim]
Lehrer Show. It’s true, they’ll give you five to seven minutes or whatever as opposed
to forty-five seconds. It’s true that thoughtful people watch it....
I: You’re on [NPR’s] Marketplace.
R: Yeah, I’m on Marketplace. But that’s not nearly as good as being on All Things
Considered. You know, just a bigger audience and you get more time and, again, a
thoughtful audience. [It’s] useful in part because I’m amazed at the number of people
who listen to NPR commuting. You know, serious people.31
On the thorny synthesis of contradictory roles
Disentangling the idioms on which policy experts draw to arrive at their unique self-
understandings is a valuable but potentially deceptive analytical act. This is because few policy
experts are content to choose just one of the models listed above. Instead, they share a
professional ethos built on the goal of mastering and juggling all four. The importance of merging
disparate styles is a ubiquitous theme in the discourse of most policy experts. For example, a
Brookings Institution fellow describes how her organization recruits new staff members:
I: If you’re hiring a new scholar here at Brookings, what are the marks of a good policy
researcher? Who are you looking for?
28 Author interview, Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution, February 11, 2004.
30 Author interview, David Boaz, Cato Institute, November 24, 2003.
31 Author interview, Bruce Stokes, National Journal and Council on Foreign Relations, June 30, 2003.
29 Author interview, Charles Kolb, Committee for Economic Development, November 26, 2003.
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R: Good track record in writing stuff, usually.
I: Writing, like, op-ed pieces, or writing in academic journals?
R: Writing both. Brookings would look for somebody who had written a really good
book on something or a series of not-too-academic journal articles. But if there had
been some op-eds and things, that would be a plus. If this was a person who was a
good speaker and presenter, that would be a plus.32
The president of the Competitive Enterprise Institute offers a vivid analogy for the difficulty
of juggling multiple roles:
I use the analogy—I’ve used it for years—public policy is...like having a vaudeville
act or something. You go up on the stage and you’re juggling and you’re singing, and
you’re balancing. And then you run behind the curtain and run up in the audience and
applaud madly. And then you run back up on the stage and you juggle. And then you
run back and applaud madly. If you do it right, all of a sudden other people start
applauding and you’ve got a hit.33
However, what may appear first as a “quadruple bind”—or a four-sided pursuit of
academic, political, entrepreneurial, and media authority—turns out, on closer inspection, to
have a bipolar structure. This is because the goals associated with three of the four idioms—
namely, political access, funding, and publicity—are more easily brought into line with one
another than any of them can be reconciled with the pursuit of academic consecration.
Political access, for example, is often a boon to a policy expert’s media visibility, which may
in turn positively shape his or her fundraising capacity. The goal of scholarly rigor, on the
other hand, more often demands a certain insulation from commercial pressures, freedom
from political censorship, and relative indifference to publicity. Thus, overlaying the four-
cornered structure of the policy expert’s role is a master opposition between intellectual
credibility, on the one side, and temporal power, on the other.
Naturally, most policy experts cannot truly balance the two demands—first, because
each one requires a great deal of social learning, and second, because the sensibilities they
require tend to be at loggerheads. As the president of the Institute for Policy Studies
laments: “Mostly all those skills don’t come together in one person, and so...almost
everyone we hire, I believe, is stronger in one side or the other.”34 A separation thus
appears among policy experts that parallels an opposition described by journalist Bruce
Reed:
Strip away the job titles and party labels, and you will find two kinds of people in
Washington: political hacks and policy wonks. Hacks come to Washington because
anywhere else they'd be bored to death. Wonks come here because nowhere else
could we bore so many to death. These divisions extend far beyond the hack havens
of political campaigns and consulting firms and the wonk ghettos of think tanks on
34 Author interview, John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies, August 26, 2003. On a similar note, Greg
Anrig, vice president of the Century Foundation, explains: “It really is difficult to find somebody who is very
smart and knowledgeable [and] who also is able to write effectively and clearly for people who aren’t experts
and can talk to the media to provide sound bites.” Whereas academic scholars tend to be too narrow in their
focus, “people from [Capitol] Hill...are more likely to have the skills to be able to communicate and talk in
sound bites. The flip side of that, though, is the heft. They typically don’t have Ph.D’s, by and large. They
haven’t developed an expertise beyond the ‘faster turnaround’ kind of stuff.” (Author interview, Greg Anrig,
The Century Foundation, November 21, 2003)
33 Author interview, Fred Smith, Jr., Competitive Enterprise Institute, December 16, 2003.
32 Author interview, Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution, February 11, 2004.
Qual Sociol (2010) 33:549–562 557
Dupont Circle. Some journalists are wonks, but most are hacks. Some columnists are
hacks, but most are wonks. All members of Congress pass themselves off as wonks,
but many got elected as hacks. Lobbyists are hacks who make money pretending to
be wonks. The Washington Monthly, The New Republic, and the entire political
blogosphere consist largely of wonks pretending to be hacks. “The Hotline” is for
hacks; National Journal is for wonks. “The West Wing” is for wonks; “K Street” was
for hacks. After two decades in Washington as a wonk working among hacks, I have
come to the conclusion that the gap between Republicans and Democrats is as
nothing compared to the one between these two tribes.35
In this language, “wonks” are the more academically affiliated policy experts, or those who
bring to the production of policy research technical skills and credentials; “hacks,” by
contrast, are those who enter this contest with fewer educational credentials, but tend to be
more closely aligned with centers of political, economic, and media power.
Nevertheless, policy experts try to walk the thin line between the two. The conflict
between intellectual and temporal authority obtains within the “professional psyche” of the
individual policy expert. “We’re Janus-faced, looking in both directions,” says one
Brookings Institution fellow.36 Other policy experts describe feeling pushed and pulled in
opposite directions by the demands of their job. For example, some think tanks encourage
their fellows to advise politicians and candidates for public office, even while requiring
them to separate such consulting from their official organizational duties. Brookings
Institution fellows are permitted to advise candidates “in a personal capacity, outside
regular business hours and without use of Brookings resources,” while the American
Enterprise Institute says that its “scholars and fellows frequently do take positions on policy
and other issues, including explicit advocacy for or against legislation...[but] when they do,
they are speaking for themselves and not for AEI or its trustees or other scholars or
employees.”37 The Institute for Policy Studies is similarly equivocal in its claim that it
“works with but is independent of political parties and movements.”38 A Center for
American Progress fellow describes the sense of liminality that can result from orienting
oneself to multiple social worlds: “I personally exist in a kind of never-never land of the
nexus of all of these worlds—journalism, academia, think tank, politics—and none of them
entirely satisfy me.”39
A certain Faustian quality thus marks the policy expert’s mission. Like the protagonist of
Goethe’s tragedy, who is driven by an insatiable desire to learn everything that can be
known, a policy expert faces an assignment that is cumbersome at best and impossible at
worst. This much becomes clear from the Manhattan Institute’s stated goal of “Combining
35 The Washington Monthly, New Republic, and National Journal are all political magazines; “The Hotline”
is the National Journal’s “blogometer,” a daily compendium of political web blogs (see http://blogometer.
nationaljournal.com/, retrieved on July 31, 2006); “The West Wing” is a television series that aired on NBC
from 1999 to 2006; “K Street” was a short-lived HBO television series that aired in 2003.
36 Author interview, Henry Aaron, Brookings Institution, November 19, 2003. Aaron referred to Brookings’
dual orientation to academic and political debates. He continued, “I would say the relative importance of the
face looking toward the academic world has diminished. It’s uneven. We still put out a journal called
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity...but little of the rest of the activities here by most of the staff aims
toward, [or] would count favorably, if they were applying for a university job.”
37 Brookings Institution website, http://www.brookings.edu/index/aboutresearch.html, retrieved on May 24,
2007; American Enterprise Institution website, http://www.aei.org/about/filter.all/default.asp, retrieved on
May 24, 2007.
38 My emphasis. Institute for Policy Studies website, http://www.ips-dc.org/overview.htm, retrieved on May
24, 2007.
39 Author interview, Eric Alterman, Center for American Progress, November 21, 2003.
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intellectual seriousness and practical wisdom with intelligent marketing and focused
advocacy.”40 Because of the “three against one” pattern described above, the policy expert’s
stance toward the academic world tends to be one of special ambivalence. Typically, this
stance begins with a statement of kinship; for instance, many policy experts praise their
own organizations in a manner that underscores their association with research universities:
“Like a good academic institution, there is a real protection of academic freedom here,”
says one fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.41 Yet stated affinities with academia
often give way to sharp critiques of “ivory tower” esotercism and public disengagement.
Says a former vice president of the Heritage Foundation: “There are countless [academic]
disciplines that are very inward looking. I would say inward looking, incestuous, and not
very interesting. And that don’t add much, don’t have much wisdom to contribute to
anybody outside of their discipline.”42
The criticism aimed at academic scholars by policy experts has two components. The
first is that academic social science is marred by empty or ritualistic displays of
methodological proficiency. Many policy experts, for example, argue that the statistical
modeling techniques favored by their academic counterparts contribute little to actual
policymaking discussions. In the view of one policy expert, “These economists like to build
their models that have nothing to do with the real world and that’s one of the reasons I think
the think tanks have risen. [Think tanks] are more interested in talking about what the real
world is.”43 Another policy expert makes a similar point: “In economics, they put a lot of
stock in economic modeling and, I have to say, I just find that such a waste of time because
I could show you anything you want in an economic model. The question is, is it really
saying anything about the world?...To me it’s just absolutely pointless. It is a ritual that gets
people tenure.”44 The second part of the policy expert’s critique of scholars, and a curious
analogue to the criticism of statistics, is that the discursive turn in the humanities and social
sciences encourages excessive abstraction and relativistic thinking. A Heritage Foundation
fellow explains his view:
I think what had happened [when Heritage began] is that professors had become
increasingly more and more arcane in their studies, had turned inward, affected by the
various trends which were going on at that time, whether it was Foucault or Derrida
and all the rest of those guys. You know, “Nothing is real. It’s all relative.” Well,
that’s not exactly what a politician wants. He’s looking for some answers to a
particular problem, not, “Well, there is no answer.”
From the perspective of many policy experts, the growth of formal modeling techniques and
the discursive turn in the humanities and social sciences are two sides of the same coin of
esotericism.
Most policy experts are, of course, aware of the counter-accusation that they are “failed
academics,” and that their negativity toward the university springs more from pride or
defensiveness than from an honest appraisal of academic research. They are mindful, for
example, that academic scholars may perceive their work as lacking rigor. In response,
many emphasize the special skills they have acquired in the course of their time at the think
40 Manhattan Institute website, http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/about_mi.htm, retrieved on May 24,
2007.
44 Author interview, Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research, June 11, 2003.
43 Author interview, David Boaz, Cato Institute, November 24, 2003.
42 Author interview, Adam Meyerson, Philanthropy Roundtable, March 16, 2004.
41 Author interview, Norm Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute, June 15, 2004.
Qual Sociol (2010) 33:549–562 559
tank. For example, an American Enterprise Institute fellow and ex-political science
professor reflects on the considerable level of mastery needed to write newspaper op-ed
pieces: “This is an acquired skill and something that is difficult for most academics to do. If
you are used to writing journal articles or writing books, there is no discipline that comes to
bear in the sense that you have got to limit this to a small space.”45 Compared with
academic writing, this respondent says, drafting op-ed pieces for the newspaper “is harder
to do. It takes more internal discipline....You don’t have the luxury of meandering around.
You’ve got to focus and pinpoint.”
Many policy experts also emphasize their greater relevance to policymaking, including
the fact that temporality of policy research is closer to that of policymaking than to
scholarship. For example, to the question, “What are the marks of a good researcher here?”
the director of the California Institute replied, “Timeliness. It’s not just seeing something,
but it’s also getting it out fast. I think the value here is being able to rip things out in a
hurry. The staff here is really good at that.”46 A veteran of several think tanks likewise
observes that, “The policy process occurs in real time, and so coming out with a really
useful study two years after the reauthorization of the bill is of no earthly use to anyone
who is engaged in the real policy process. So one thing think tanks are aware of is the
policy schedule.”47 The fact that policy schedules constitute “real time” in the minds of
some policy experts illustrates their orientation to the temporality of the political field, even
as it distances them from the elongated cycles of academic production.
Another point of difference between scholarly work and policy expertise lies in their
separate languages. A Center for American Progress fellow explains that, “There are...folks
in academic life who have learned a certain style of communication that works very well
within their own peer group but doesn’t translate easily into either the Washington
environment or the broader national policy drama.”48 As a Century Foundation vice
president similarly observes, “Academics are especially forced to be very narrow in their
focus... [and] have no incentive to do other kinds of work that would be broader policy-
oriented work if they’re situated in an environment where they’re trying to get tenure.”49 A
policy expert, by contrast, must speak the language of political debate. As the president of
the Brookings Institution points out, “One difference between a think tank and a university
is that we do not go in much for ‘pure’ research—which is to say, we emphasize research
that is relevant and useful to policymakers.”50
Given their asymmetrical pattern of commitment to the four professional idioms, and the
inner conflict to which it gives rise, why do policy experts not simply discard the academic
model altogether? Why not embrace only the political, entrepreneurial, and media models?
The answer, undoubtedly, is that the idiom of academic production provides policy experts
45 Author interview, Norm Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute, June 15, 2004.
48 Author interview, Mark Agrast, Center for American Progress, July 27, 2004.
49 Author interview, Greg Anrig, The Century Foundation, November 21, 2003.
50 Washington Post online chat, http://www.washingtonpost.com/, retrieved on September 14, 2004.
47 Author interview, William Galston, University of Maryland, June 3, 2004. Anti-tax activist Grover
Norquist highlights the difference between academic and political temporalities in similar terms:
I: What are the marks of a good policy report?
GN: Timeliness. Legislation moves at certain times. A study of the impact of the French Revolution done at
a university is interesting this year. It will be interesting in five years. A study on why a particular piece of
legislation would be good or bad for the economy is only of interest in the context of the fact that the
legislation is going to be discussed and voted on.
Author interview, Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform, August 2, 2004.
46 Author interview, Tim Ransdell, California Institute, July 21, 2003.
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with an indispensable font of authority, as well as a means of symbolic separation from
lobbyists, activists, and political aides. Without this connection, policy experts would run
the risk of looking too much like their K Street or Capitol Hill cousins, whose material
resources and political access inevitably overshadow their own. In sum, while the scholarly
component of the policy expert’s repertoire may be difficult to reconcile with the other
idioms, it is nonetheless critical to the strategy as a whole. The assertion of scholarly
proficiency signals insulation from political and economic constraint, the hallmark of any
intellectual’s authority.
Conclusion
Across writings both popular and scholarly, the image of the think tank-affiliated policy
expert oscillates between two radically different profiles. On the one side is the image of the
“bona fide intellectual,” a picture invoked whenever policy experts are called to testify
before Congress, or whenever a journalist juxtaposes a policy expert’s pronouncements
with those of academic social scientists, thereby suggesting their equivalence. We can see
the same idea reflected in the impulse to classify policy experts as “public intellectuals.” In
2006, for example, the Economist (under the heading “Public intellectuals are thriving in
the United States”) cited the existence of “Grand Academies in the form of lavishly-funded
think-tanks, well over 100 of them in Washington alone” to support its claim that in “the
world of public policy today...it is America that is the land of the intellectuals and Europe
that is the intellect-free zone.”51 The image of the policy expert as an intellectual is also
reproduced in the scholarly literature, especially in studies carried out in the pluralist
tradition, which usually commence by granting think tanks their “independence” by
definitional fiat.52
On the other side is the widespread notion that a policy expert is actually a “political
mercenary,” or essentially a lobbyist in disguise. Christopher Buckley’s satirical novel
Thank You for Smoking captures this idea in its sardonic portrayal of a think tank-like
organization called the Academy of Tobacco Studies which operates as a shameless front
group for the tobacco industry. (The novel’s main character, Nick Naylor, is a charismatic
but disreputable PR virtuoso who boasts of his ability to defend virtually any claim, no
matter how untenable.) One finds a similar portrait of the policy expert in certain media
accounts, such as the National Public Radio series, “Under the Influence,” whose title
implied that policy experts are marked by a combination of subservience and mental
impairment. Finally, in academic discourse, studies carried out in the elite theory tradition
inaugurated by C. Wright Mills yield a picture of the policy expert that is quite compatible
with the idea of a political mercenary (Dye 1978; Peschek 1987; Domhoff 1999).
This piece moves the discussion about policy experts beyond the false dichotomy of the
“mercenary” and the “intellectual.” I have argued that policy experts must undertake a
never-ending effort to balance and reconcile several contradictory functions. Because their
legitimacy as intellectuals turns on the ability to signal their autonomy, they must
continually proclaim their association with academic production, even as they work to
downplay it in other aspects of their role. Thus, while it would be too simplistic to dismiss
the scholarly aspect of the policy expert’s role as “just a veneer,” nor can we forget that the
51 The Economist. 2006. “The Battle of Ideas.” May 23. See also Bai (2003), who characterizes the Heritage
Foundation as “like a university unto itself.”
52 For a critique, see Medvetz (2011).
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same expert’s intellectual production is always hedged about on all sides by a set of
profound political and economic constraints.
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